Abstract
Sherman's campaigns skillfully blended the advantages of terrain and mobility with maneuver, maintaining the initiative and freedom of action. Current defense initiatives point toward a leaner force, with the ability to respond to crises quickly with minimal logistics support. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not have the luxury of secure bases of operations or a lengthy period to build up supplies prior to the commencement of hostilities.
Sherman emphasized maneuver, mobility and logistical self-sustainment to the maximum extent possible. Success in future conflicts may depend on the ability of joint forces to operate very much like Sherman did in 1864. 
Space.
The wilderness terrain of northern Georgia consisted of "deep rivers and streams, rough mountains, steep ravines, lush forests and entangling underbrush…" 5 , all of which provided excellent defensive positions. The roads, such that there were, were often in poor condition. The terrain was such that both Sherman and Johnston felt his opponent benefited.
According to Sherman, "the obstructing mountains, streams and forests offset his numerical advantage" 6 while Johnston complained that the terrain "protected Sherman's flanking movements." Sherman commenced his march to Savannah with approximately 60,000 troops. In preparation for this movement he "…purged his forces of the weak, wounded and sick…" 10 , retaining a core of battle hardened troops. After Hood's movement to the north there was little opposition, as "…there were no defenders worthy of the name on Georgia's soil…" 11 In
Sherman's path stood "an inadequate state militia, composed largely of boys 16 and under and men of 55 and older." 12 The primary threat to Sherman's forces was posed by
Confederate General Wheeler's cavalry and some militia, totaling about 7,000 men. In addition, there were approximately 15,000 troops in the Confederate garrison at Savannah.
Time.
The overall timing of the start of Sherman's campaign was critical, as a key component of the overall Union strategic plan. Sherman was required to commence his offensive in conjunction with four other offensives. After assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on March 18th, Sherman had less than two months to prepare for the Spring campaign. He took aggressive action to ensure manpower and logistics readiness.
As discussed above, the distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta was 137 miles. The campaign would be a lengthy one, with Sherman's speed of advance affected by the rough terrain and by Johnston's opposition. There was no specific timetable, though it was clearly desirable to achieve success as quickly as possible. While holding a disdain for politics, Sherman was aware that a victory would be a boon for northern morale as well as Lincoln's prospects in the November 1864 election.
C. Operational Functions.
Operational Command and Control. subordinates to achieve unity of effort.
Operational Movement and Maneuver.
As discussed above, Sherman's objective was the destruction of Johnston's army. He hoped for a decisive battle, but was reluctant to attack Johnston's fortifications directly. Thus he envisioned a series of maneuvers to flank the enemy out of his fixed positions. Sherman's plan for the employment of his army was …to have one part exposed inviting an attack by the enemy, aiming to inflict on him a superior loss while the rest of the army is moving to some exposed and vital object or line of retreat to the enemy.
Sherman understood that such a plan involved risk, but he gambled that he would be able to concentrate his forces for a general engagement before Johnston could destroy one segment of his army via sudden assault. To conduct the march to Savannah, Sherman would have to permanently break free from his rail lifeline and forage off the land as Grant had done during the Vicksburg campaign in 1863. 36 Sherman learned from his experience serving under Grant, and had successfully used such an approach during operations around Meridian, Mississippi in February 1864. 37 Sherman "imposed rigid restrictions…on the items the army could take with it." 38 The supply trains consisted of "2,500 wagons and 600 light ambulances. Rations for twenty days and forage for five were carried, as well as 200 rounds of ammunition per man…while each soldier marched out with 40 rounds on his person." 39 In addition, the army traveled with enough live beef for forty days in the field. 40 During the march, Sherman's army was well supplied by teams of foragers, known as "bummers." 41 These men scouted ahead and to the flanks of the marching troops, returning in the evening with a bounty of foodstuffs from Georgia farmlands previously untouched by the war.
Operational Protection.
As previously noted, Sherman's army was heavily dependant on the railroad link between Chattanooga and Atlanta for supplies, food and reinforcements. As he moved south Sherman detached troops to protect the railroad and garrison key points. He also directed forces from Tennessee to deter Confederate cavalry raiders such as Nathan Bedford Forrest. 42 Sherman successfully used his own cavalry to screen his movements as well as deceive the enemy as to his intentions. For example, as Sherman's forces approached the Chattahoochee River he used cavalry forces on his right flank to feign searching for a river crossing while he planned to actually cross the river to the left.
Sherman also successfully used deception during the march to Savannah. As the two wings of his army moved southeast, he induced the massing of the available Confederate forces at various points then bypassed them, "leaving the troops useless and unavailable." Sherman's use of flanking movements disoriented Johnston from the beginning of the campaign. 49 Sherman continued to take advantage of his superior mobility by flanking the enemy and avoiding, for the most part, costly frontal assaults. As a Confederate prisoner noted, "Sherman'll never go to hell. He will flank the devil and make heaven in spite of the guards." 50 Sherman maintained the initiative and freedom of action by staying with his plan:
he did what he wanted to do, rather than what the enemy wanted him to do.
Logistics.
Sherman clearly understood the importance of logistics and preparations. He noted, "the least part of a general's work is to fight a battle." 51 Sherman's thorough knowledge of his army's requirements was key in the massing of sufficient supplies to support offensive operations. Sherman's design is reflected in current U.S. Army doctrine, which stresses the importance of preparing bases of operation, selecting and improving lines of communication,
preparing forward logistics bases and stockpiling resources. 52 Due to the limited quantity of rolling stock available, Sherman took control of rail traffic to ensure the movement of men and materiel to his army. While today's commander will probably not have authority or opportunity to commandeer his own strategic lift, Sherman's actions highlight the need for robust lift capability, with the proper assets dedicated to moving supplies and reinforcements.
OMFTS.
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is a concept that envisions "the maneuver of naval expeditionary forces at the operational level of warfare, to exploit enemy weaknesses and deliver a decisive blow." 53 Virginia, where three years of war had seriously depleted resources necessary to support an army in the field. Today's forces are also dependant on fuel re-supply as well as ammunition. Vehicles must be employed in order to achieve the desired level of mobility, 56 yet it is unrealistic to expect a MAGTF to carry sufficient fuel to operate for any significant length of time. To be successful, OMFTS should strive for a balance between selfsustainment and sea-based support.
Sherman improved the mobility of his force in several ways. He reduced his overall number of personnel, retaining the strongest veterans, and limited the length of his supply train. Sherman's veteran troops carried a minimum of equipment on their persons, having learned from years of marching and fighting which items were essential. The modern soldier carries a much larger variety of equipment into battle. While mobility is a great advantage, it is risky to seek mobility at the cost of combat power or sustainment. The commander should ensure forces and equipment required are matched to the threat or mission.
Echoes of Sherman can be heard in the new Bush administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is leading a review which seems to favor "…a fundamental change toward a leaner, nimbler military." 57 While the Rumsfeld review it not yet complete, its apparent focus on lighter, faster forces could set a template for logistics, procurement, force structure and employment which will drive U.S defense policy well into the future. In his Georgia campaign, Sherman emphasized maneuver, mobility and logistical selfsufficiency to the maximum extent possible. In future conflicts, U.S. forces may not have the luxury of secure bases of operations in the theater of operations or a lengthy period to build up supplies prior to commencement of hostilities. 58 Success in such conflicts may depend on concepts such as OMFTS, with forces operating very much like Sherman did in 1864.
Summary. Grant's direction to Sherman specified the Confederate army as his 
